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ARTICLE
LIFTING THE FLOOR: SEX, CLASS, AND EDUCATION

.

.

By: Naomi Cabn and June Carbone

T

hird-wave feminism emphasizes the possibilities that come with
choice. Women can choose to be wives, mothers, employees,
bosses, hobos, harlots, veiled Islamists, semi-observant Catholics,
provocateurs of any stripe, in mix or match settings in which no role
necessarily excludes any other, or permanently defines the women
occupying it. As third-wave feminists celebrate the possibility of
choice, however, it is critical to ground this option in the class
perspective that is an integral part of the third-wave itself; otherwise,
third-wave feminism risks diminishing the prospects for solidarity
with a working class that might happily trade the illusion of choice for
more rigidly defined structures that offer the prospect of greater
support. Third-wave feminism recognizes the importance of "raising
the floor,,,l and this paper - from two second-wave feminists - helps
in developing an agenda for achieving that goal.
Integrating a class analysis into feminism is not new, of course;
many second-wave feminists, while concerned with male/femalf;
equality, also sought to ensure that feminism did not exclude poor and
working-class women. Barbara Ehrenreich, for example, has written
eloquently about "making ends meet.,,2 Theda Skocpol, Frances Fox
Piven, and Gwendolyn Mink have called our attention to the impact of
3
welfare on women.
In this paper, we approach class issues through the lens of family
law, examining how a state's approach to issues of family leave and
contraception affects class mobility. Indeed, the "culture wars," as
they play out in high profile Supreme Court decisions and legislative
• Naomi Cahn is the John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, GWU Law School;
June Carbone is the Edward A. SmithlMissouri Chair of Law, the Constitution and Society,
University of Missouri-Kansas City.
1 JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMy RICHARDS, MANIFESTA: YOUNG WOMEN, FEMINISM,
AND THE FUTURE 82 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2000).
2 BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMEO: ON (NOT) GETTING By IN AMERICA 220-21
(Henry Holt and Co., LLC 2001).
3 GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S ENDS 8 (Cornell University Press 1998); FRANCES Fox
PIVEN, Welfare and Work, in WHOSE WELFARE? 97 (Gwendolyn Mink ed., Cornell University
Press 1999); THEDA SKOCPOL, THE MISSING MIDDLE: WORKING FAMILIES AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICA SOCIAL POLICY 13 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2000).
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fights over abortion and same-sex marriage, are first and foremost
about family values. Family values in the United States are not
unitary; different families in different parts of the country are leading
different lives. A new family culture has emerged among middle class
men and women that is geared for the post-industrial economy. With
fertility rates dropping and the average age of marriage moving into
the late twenties, states deregulate sexuality, identify responsibility
with financial independence, respect equality and autonomy, and
safeguard access to contraception and abortion for teens and adults.
Middle class men and women reap the benefits.
This new culture, in both its feminist and non-feminist iterations,
fetishizes choice. It does so because it is grounded in a socialization
that makes the exercise of autonomy - and the transfer of
responsibility for investment in human capital from institutions to
individuals - foundational to middle-class life. The centerpiece of
the cultural reorganization is the emergence of the twenties as a period
of exploration of jobs, career possibilities, relationships, and gender
roles and attributes, with the deferral of irrevocable choices and
permanent responsibilities until the far more mature - and financially
independent - thirties.
With greater autonomy and fewer unacceptable pathways,
however, comes less societal support for any course of action.
Traditionalists, who bemoan loss of the insistence on societally
approved pathways emphasizing abstinence, marriage, and the gender
roles that made early marriage universal and enduring, have launched
something of a counterattack. Rooted in more religious, rural and
conservative communities, they play on feelings of moral crisis to
promote a "values" agenda that celebrates chastity and pumps
government money into marriage promotion programs. Largely
invisible in the political reaction to their efforts, however, is the fact
that their embrace of more traditional values - one more acceptable
choice among many - in fact dramatically restricts the avenues open
to the most disadvantaged Americans, and further blocks any hope of
progress into the increasingly hard to attain status of middle-class life.
The critical moral issues that divide the two systems of family law
- issues such as abstinence education, abortion, and gay relationships
- center on control of sexuality, particularly female sexuality. If, as
Professor Bridget Crawford notes, one of the challenges of third-wave
feminism, is "to develop an account of the law's ability to enhance
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women's autonomy and well-being,,,4 then the blue state model is
radical because it allows women to control their own sexuality. On
the other hand, the emphasis in third-wave feminism on autonomy and
choice may obscure the restriction of choice for those without the
means to secure autonomy. Indeed, the very acceptance of traditional
values as within the ambit of permissible options may have muted
political opposition to abstinence and marriage programs, obscuring
their role in making contraception and abortion less available to poor
women. The resulting increase in teen births and single mothers, all
within the realm of permissible practices, then becomes identified only
with conservative concerns. The role of moralistic restrictions and
government budget cuts in engineering the increase in unplanned
pregnancies disappears from view. Yet, genuine autonomy and choice
for both men and women depend on the ability to secure educational
opportunities and control fertility. Early births to impoverished women,
who are disproportionately likely to be victims of sexual coercion and to
lack support from family or mates, derail education, and lock single
mothers into marginal positions unlikely to provide opportunities for the
work-life balance available to more highly educated women.
After a brief exploration of these two models, this paper makes
two critical points: (1) it correlates the different models to the varying
approaches to parental leave laws; and (2) expands our discussion of
women and care beyond the workplace and child care, exploring what
contributes to women's ability to care for their children and others:
education, an outcome that is associated with deferred childbearing
and higher income in the newer family model. It is in looking at the
impact of education that we can get at some of the variations within
each model based on class and race. Our conversation about thirdwave feminism must examine women's means of moving between
classes and being able to provide better care to themselves and to
others (whether it be children or parents or significant others).
Moreover, educating women serves to challenge gendered stereotypes
and is another means for putting pressure on others to help with the
care-work.
I. DIFFERENT FAMIL Y MODELS

Third-wave feminism's most pressing challenge may be the effort
to combine its celebration of "choice" - the ideal of elites - with
renewed attention to economic inequality and the construction of class.
4 Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women,
Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. 1. GENDER & L. 99, 168 (2007).
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The first part of the challenge comes from the fact that an insistence
on autonomy may reflect the needs of the new information economy
as much as an authentic feminist perspective. The second is the risk
that the new middle class model that makes women's greater
autonomy realistic may simultaneously undermine the ability of
working class women to realize the promises of middle class life.
These contradictions may lay the groundwork for something that may
ultimately define the third-wave, viz., a renewed political and legal
conSClOusness.
Underlying these contradictions is tension in the United States
between the two different family systems that guide the transition from
adolescence to adulthood. In the older, more traditional system, the
entry into adulthood corresponded with the assumption of adult roles
- marriage, childbearing, and employment. The new system, which
we have termed "the new middle class morality," identifies adulthood
with financial independence and emotional maturity. This system
corresponds to the needs of the information economy. Employment
has become less secure. With greater turnover, employers invest less
in training new workers. The new pathway to the middle class
emphasizes adaptability; too early an assumption of permanent
commitments may derail better opportunities later. The twenties have
accordingly become a time of education, internships, skill acquisition,
job transitions, and serial relationships.s The results pay off handsomely
for family formation in the thirties. Dual career families earn more and
enjoy more of a cushion that allows them to weather financial adversity.
Moreover, the new patterns produce more independent women, who can
6
more successfully demand and find companionate mates. College
educated women are the only group in society whose marriage rates
have increased, and the marriages they enter are as stable as the unions
of the mid-1960s, the period before no-fault divorce, the legalization of
abortion, or widespread use of the pill.
A distinguishing feature of the new middle class model is delay in
childbearing. The average age of first birth for the country as a whole
has risen from 21.4 in 1970 to 25.2 in 2004, what Elizabeth Gregory
7
terms "an enormous change." For college-educated women, the
8
average age of first birth is 30.1. Within such a model, "responsible"
S See June Carbone, Age Matters: Class, Family Formation, and Inequality, 48 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 901, 954, 958 (2008).

6 ELIZABETH GREGORY, READY: WHY WOMEN ARE EMBRACING THE NEW, LATER
MOTHERHOOD 8-9 (Basic Books 2007).
7 Jd. at 2-3.
8Id.
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reproduction follows financial independence and emotional maturity.
Contraception is accordingly an imperative, and abortion an important,
if regrettable, backup.
greater access to
The legal correlates of this model contraception and abortion, equality and autonomy for women,
tolerance for sexuality - have been most widely accepted in the
wealthier areas of the country - urban areas, the Northeast and the
West Coast, the upper mid-west. They are also deeply threatening to
the more traditional and more religious areas of the country, identified
with the core of Bush's support in the 2004 election. These "red
states," or more accurately, the politically active RepUblicans who
have pushed a "moral values" agenda, reject the new culture. They
continue to emphasize religious teachings that celebrate the unity of
sex, marriage, and reproduction. As a result of the emphasis on
chastity and abstinence education for teenagers and the lesser
availability of contraception and abortion, however, red states have
higher teen pregnancy rates, more shot gun marriages, and lower
average ages of marriage and first births. Not only are these, in turn,
associated with lower income, but early marriage and shotgun
weddings also correlate with higher divorce rates. Both divorce and
the cognitive dissonance that comes from the lengthening period of
time between the beginning of sexual activity and marriage in all
states produces a sense of moral crisis that in tum fuels political
support for abstinence education, marriage promotion, and further
restrictions on access not only to abortion, but contraception. The
result increases the likelihood of early pregnancy for the working class
- teen birth rates increased in 2006 for the first time since 1991 and makes support for the workforce participation of young mothers
that much more critical.
The lack of agreement about acceptable paths to adulthood, and
the diverging needs of the middle and working classes, complicate an
effective political response. Welfare reform illustrates the tensions.
The legislation and subsequent implementation efforts reflect an
emphasis on marriage, associated with a more traditional and red state
approach - but less than 1% of welfare leavers did so for marriage.
A second aspect of welfare reform, however, reflects blue state values:
there is a strong emphasis on work. Yet welfare reform does not
provide the necessary support for either marriage or work. It lacks the
necessary support for helping men find employment, and it does not
provide adequate attention for either training women for better jobs
nor for facilitating mothers' participation in a family unfriendly labor
market.
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II. THE IMPACT ON CARE
The need to balance work and family affects men and women
regardless of class. Through the Federal Family and Medical Leave
Act ("FMLA"), all workers who satisfy certain criteria, such as size of
employer and length of time at employment, are guaranteed at least
9
twelve weeks of unpaid family and medical leave. This section
addresses patterns of the FMLA usage as well as the various ways in
which states have supplemented the federal leave guarantees. As this
discussion shows, not only are poor women less likely to have access
to leave and related balancing benefits, but also, blue states are far
more likely to have enacted legislation that protects the work family
balance.
A. Class and Care:

The care picture is complicated by limits in FMLA coverage, the
inability to take unpaid leave, and access to paid leave. First, almost
40% of employees are not at worksites subject to the FMLA,1O and
because not all of those employees have satisfied the prerequisites,
only 54% of the workforce is eligible to take FMLA leave. II Second,
even among those workers who are covered, many (according to one
study, more than three-quarters) cannot take the leave because they
cannot afford to take unpaid leave. 12
Third, although FMLA leave is unpaid, some employees do have
access to paid leave. Approximately 40% of working parents earning
less than 200% of the federal poverty level have no access to paid
leave at all (no paid sick days, vacation, nor personal days).13 Among
9 An employee eligible for leave under the FMLA must be employed for at least "12
months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under section 2612 of this
title; and for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month
period." 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2) (2008). The FMLA only applies to employers who employ "50
or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in
the current or preceding calendar year." ld. at § 2611(4). Assuming an employee is eligible
for leave under the FMLA and works for an employer covered by the FMLA, the employee
shall be entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave. Jd. at § 2612(a)-(c).
10 JODI GRANT, TAYLOR HATCHER & NIRALI PATEL, EXPECTING BETTER: A STATE BY STATE
ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAMS 7 (2005) [hereinafter Expecting Better], available
at http://www.nationalpartnership.orgisitelDocServer/ParentaILeaveReportMay05.pdf?doclD
=1052.
II Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department of Labor's
Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35550, 35622 (June 28, 2007), available at
http://www.dol.gov/esa!whdIFMLA2007Reportl2007FinaIReport.pdf.
12 Expecting Better, supra note 10, at 7.
13 ld. at 8.
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low wage workers, 76% do not have access to paid sick leave.
Indeed, as a general matter, low wage workers are less likely than
higher-income workers to be covered by family leave policies, to be
eligible to take even unpaid family leave, or, much less, to receive
paid family leave. 15 They are also less likely to have access to flexible
scheduling. 16
While highly educated and higher income women are more likely
to have access to paid leave than women with less education and lower
incomes, still one-third of those highly educated and higher income
women lack access to any form of paid maternity leave. In fact, 35%
of highly educated women are forced to take unpaid maternity leave,
compared to 47% of women who have less than a high school
17
education who must take unpaid maternity leave. Women with a
college degree were three times more likely to take paid leave
following the birth of their first child (58.7%) than women with less
than a high school education (17.8%); while 56.4% of women with
less than a high school education took unpaid leave, only 38.6% of
women with a college degree used unpaid leave. 18 Moreover, women
in blue states have better health care coverage. The five states with the
lowest rate of uninsured women are all blue - Hawaii (11.2%),
Minnesota (11.5%), Massachusetts (11.9%), Maine (12.1 %), and Iowa
(12.9%).19

B. Who Cares?
The work and family balance that makes it possible for women to
remain in the workplace is more critical to the newer model - and to
Id. at 8.
"In March 2005, 54% of workers who made more than $15 per hour had access to a
short-term disability policy, while only 28% of workers earning less than $15 per hour had
access to a short-term disability policy. Similarly, 46% of workers who made over $15 per
hour had access to long-term disability leave, while only 16% of workers making less than
$15 per hour had access to long-term disability leave. There are similar disparities in access
to paid sick leave and paid holidays. Eighty-eight percent of workers making more than $15
per hour had access to paid holidays, and 75% of these workers had access to paid sick leave.
Meanwhile, 68% of workers earning less than $15 per hour had access to paid holidays, and
only 47% had access to paid sick leave." Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Law Left Out
Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1,8 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
16 Joan C. Williams, One Sick Child Away from Being Fired: When "Opting Out" is Not
an Option 8 (2006), http://www.uchastings.edulsite_filesIWLLlonesickchild.pdf.
17 Expecting Better, supra note 10, at 7-8.
18 JULIA O. JOHNSON & BARBARA DOWNS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MATERNITY LEAVE
AND EMPLOYMENT OF FIRST-TIME MOTHERS: 1961-2000, 11 tbl.7 (2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/prodl2005pubs/p70-1 03. pdf.
19 KAISER FOUNDATION, MEDICAID'S ROLE IN FAMILY PLANNING 2 (2007), available at
http://www.kff.orglwomenshealthluploadl7064_03. pdf.
14
15
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the autonQIllY of poorer women. Through a series of different laws ranging from domestic violence protection in the workplace to paid leave
- some states (typically, those that voted Democratic in the 2004
election and are viewed as "blue states") are generally more hospitable to
working women who have families. The National Partnership on
Women and Families examined a series of different laws in developing a
state by state scorecard of parental leave programs. Several states California, Minnesota, and Washington (all blue) - have enacted paid
family leave legislation, and a series of others - all blue - have
20
considered it. More generally, with respect to a series of parental leave,
maternity benefits, and job protection for both state and private sector
employees, the top states are: California, Hawaii, Oregon, Connecticut,
New Jersey, Washington, Maine, Vermont, Minnesota, Rhode Island;
the bottom states of the bottom nineteen, only three (Delaware,
21
Maryland, and Pennsylvania) are blue. Those states that have most
consistently embraced the new family model really do support care.
III. CLASS, EDUCATION, AND CARE

Given the class variations in access to needed care, how do we, in
the words of Manifesta,22 move up the floor? It is important to
recognize here that care consists not just of spending time with
children; it also means how you care for children - are your children
going to get a good education, experience abuse, live in stable
housing, etc.
Education and teen birth matter when it comes to resources for
caring for children even outside of the workplace. Not that poverty is
necessarily bad for children - moms can be caring and poor.
However, life is much harder. In the international development
literature, it is well-known that every dollar spent on a woman's
education benefits her and her children, while every dollar spent on a
man does not. 23
20 See NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN, STATE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS
(2006), http://www.ncsl.orglprograms/employ/fmlachart.htm.
21 Expecting Better, supra note 10, at 5, 15-43, 48-49. The Report evaluated states based
on a variety of programs, including family leave benefits, medicaUmatemity leave benefits,
flexible sick days. Id. at 12-14.
22 BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note l.
23 See Franz Brotzen, Economist Backs Recommitment to World Development Goals, RICE
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.media.rice.edulmediaiNewsBot.asp?MODE=VlEW&IO=
10207; INT'L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV., WOMEN available at http://www.ifad.orgipub/factsheeti
womenlwomen_e.pdf("The imbalance between the essential roles of women and their limited
opportunities is undermining efforts to reduce poverty."); U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
TASK FORCE ON EDUC. AND GENDER EQUALITY, Toward Universal Primary Educ.:
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Let's look at women's education and poverty and the class of their
children. First, only 36% of women with less than a high school
degree worked during their first pregnancies, while 83% of women
with a college degree were in the workforce. 24 Second, education
allows parents to provide more resources for children. While the
resources available for the average child have decreased, they have
increased dramatically for those who are living the life of the new
middle class morality.25 According to Princeton professor Sara
McLanahan,
Children who were born to mothers from the most-advantaged backgrounds
are making substantial gains in resources. Relative to their counterparts 40
years ago, their mothers are more mature and more likely to be working at
well-paying jobs. These children were born into stable unions and are
spending more time with their fathers. In contrast, children born to mothers
from the most disadvantaged backgrounds are making smaller gains and, in
some instances, even losing parental resources. Their mothers are working
at low-paying jobs. Their parents' relationships are unstable, and for many,
support from their biological fathers is minimal. 26

Women without a college degree are almost twice as likely to get
27
divorced as women with a college degree.
In 2004, women with a college degree earned an average monthly
income of $2,851.00, while women with a high school education
earned less than half - $1,357.00. More highly educated women
28
earned even more - $4,837.00. Men with comparable degrees of
education exhibited the same pattern, although their earnings were
higher. Access to college is an important commodity for middle class
earning potential. Among mothers, the more highly educated women
have higher labor force participation rates. 29 In 2004, the labor force
investments, incentives, and institutions, at 5 (2005), available at http://www.unmillennium
project.orgidocumentslEducation -part I .pdf
24 JOHNSON & DOWNS, supra note 18, at 5 fig. I.
25 See June Carbone, is Fertility the Unspoken issue in the Debate Between Liberal and
Conservative Family Values?, 32 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 809, 822 (2007) (reviewing LINDA C.
MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY
(The Harvard President and Fellows 2006)).
26 SARA McLANAHAN, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second
Demographic Transition 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 608 (2004).
27 See id. at 613 fig.4.
28 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME BY EDUCATION, SEX, AGE, AND
RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, 2004, SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION, tb1.2B
(released January 29, 2008), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/education/
sipp2004w2.html.
29 HEATHER BOUSHEY, ARE WOMEN OPTING OUT? DEBUNKING THE MYTH, CENTRE FOR
ECON. POLICY RESEARCH 10 (2005), available at http://www.cepr.netldocuments/publications/
opt_out_2005 _ll_2.pdf.
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participation rate for mothers with less than a high school education
was 28.8%; for women with graduate degrees, it was 77%. These
differences held true even for mothers of children under the age of six;
18.2% of women with less than a high school education were in the
labor force, compared to 73.2% of women with graduate degrees.
Perhaps even more significantly, economist Heather Boushey found
that the "child penalty," the effect of having a child on labor force
participation rates, is negligible for highly educated women, while it is
considerable for women with less education. Employment rates for
women with less education who had children at home were 21.7% less
than for those women with the same education who did not have
children at home, while for women with a graduate degree, the
30
"penalty" rate was 1.3%.
So how do race and class play out? We hypothesize that blue laws
reinforce the blue family lifestyle, and red laws reinforce the red
family lifestyle; and that, at least in blue states, the blue lifestyle is
associated with the middle class. This, in turn, is associated with
education. According to Sara McLanahan, women with higher
education levels have much higher incomes: in 2000, for example,
their median family incomes were close to $80,000 per year, while
women with less education had median family incomes of about
$25,000 per year;31 and mothers with high levels of education are more
than two times as likely to be employed as are mothers with low
education (62% versus 30%). Women with low education levels were
more than twice as likely to become single mothers than women with
higher education; women with a four-year degree had a divorce rate of
about 17% in 2000, while women without a four-year degree had a
divorce rate almost double, at about 32%.
Moreover, earlier
childbearing is associated with less education. Almost 60% of teens
with a school-age pregnancy drop out of high school, while only 25%
of teens who do not have a child before they turn eighteen drop out of
2
schooe Only 2% of teen mothers will graduate from college, while
four times that number of women who do not have children until
twenty or twenty-one will graduate. Eighty-two percent of children
whose parents do not have a high school diploma live in poverty.
Seventy-five percent of unmarried teen mothers begin to receive
welfare within five years of their first child. Children of teen mothers
30

See id. at 11-12 tbls.5 & 6.

31 McLANAHAN, supra note 26, at 614.
32 THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, WHY IT MATTERS: TEEN
PREGNANCY AND EDUCATION, available at http://www.thenationaicampaign.org/why-it-

matters/pdfleducation.pdf.
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do not perform as well in school as children of older mothers; for
example, they are 50% more likely to repeat a grade. The daughters of
teen mothers are three times more likely to become teenage mothers
themselves as compared to daughters of mothers ages twenty and
twenty-one.
33
The blue states are beginning to learn this lesson. The five states
with the lowest rates of teen births are all concentrated in the
Northeast and all voted for Kerry: New Hampshire,34 Vermont,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine. In contrast, the five states
with the highest teen birth rates are all red and are all in the South or
the Southwest: Texas, New Mexico, Mississippi, Arizona, and
35
Arkansas. As the statistics on education and teen pregnancy show,
teen pregnancy is associated with class and can provide a significant
barrier to finishing high school and pursuing additional educational
36
opportunities. Contraception and abortion availability would help in
providing teens with the choices they need.
There are, of course, complicating factors of wealth, religion, and
ethnic diversity in reinforcing or undercutting family formation practices.
Nonetheless, however, the fact of different cultural understandings III
itself is a significant issue underlying family law decisions.
33 To make the analysis more cogent, we focus on the highest and lowest five states in
each category.
34 New Hampshire, unlike the others, however, was so close that it could be more
accurately described as "purple."
See The Washington Post, U.S. President - New
Hampshire (2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwpsrv/elections/2004/page/
295035 (demonstrating the 2004 presidential election in New Hampshire was so close that it
could more accurately be described as a "purple" state).
35 CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, TEEN BIRTH RATES RANKED LOWEST TO HIGHEST (2003)
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.orglpdfl13]DF.pdf In 1988, by contrast, the lowest teen
birth rates would have in Minnesota, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Iowa, New Hampshire,
and Vermont while the highest rates would have been in Mississippi, New Mexico, Arkansas,
Texas, and Arizona. The relative changes involve a steady decline in teen birth rates in New
England compared to stable rates in the upper Midwest. Abortion ratios, defined as the
number of abortions for every 1000 births, complement the picture of regional variation. The
states with the five highest ratios for teens are New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Maryland, all blue states from the New England or mid-Atlantic regions.
The states with the lowest teen abortion ratios are Kentucky, Louisiana, Arkansas, South
Dakota, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. With the exception of South Dakota, they are all
Southern or border states. See GUTTMACHER INSTlT., U.S. TEEN PREGNANCY STATISTICS,
NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 11 (2006). If we were to measure
abortion rates as opposed to ratios, New Jersey, New York, and Maryland would remain in the
top five, but Massachusetts and Connecticut would be replaced by Nevada and California. ld.
The lowest abortion rates would change more with the five lowest states: Utah, South Dakota,
North Dakota, Kentucky, and West Virginia. Utah, North Dakota, and South Dakota also
have relatively low teen pregnancy rates compared with Kentucky and West Virginia or the
states with higher abortion ratios.
36 McLANAHAN, supra note 26, at 614.
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Turning to race, Black and Latino teens are still two to four times as
likely as whites to become teen mothers. 37 Once they do, statistically
speaking, women who became teen mothers are likely to stay out of the
38
middle class.
The November 2007 Pew Study asked middle and
lower-class blacks what they think about each other in tenns of values,
or, the "things that people view as important or their general way of
thinking.,,39 By a two-to-one ratio, blacks said that the values of poor
and middle class blacks have grown more dissimilar over the past
decade; at the same time, most blacks say that the values of blacks and
whites have grown more alike during this same time period. On a
similar question, only about a quarter of all blacks (23%) said that
middle class and poor blacks share "a lot" of values in common, while
a plurality (42%) says they share some values in common; 22% say
they share only a little in common and 9% say they share almost no
values in common. Well-educated blacks are more likely than blacks
with less education to say that a values gap within the black
community has widened during the past decade. At the same time,
however, it is blacks with lower incomes and less education who are
most inclined to see few shared values between middle class and poor
blacks - suggesting that the perception of differences over values and
identity within the African American community is felt most strongly
by those blacks at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum. 40

III.

THE FUTURE?

Lifting up the floor requires structural supports. So far, the
attention in third-wave feminism has been on structural supports for
equality and reproductive rights, but not on the more basic fonns of
structural support that enable women to hold jobs where equality
matters and to exercise reproductive rights in a context where choice is
meaningful. While many women will not choose the middle class
model that we have articulated, and while the trend towards later
childbearing is problematic in its acceptance of women living "ideal
worker" lives, this choice should be available.

37 B.E. HAMILTON, J.A. MARTIN & SJ. VENTURA, BIRTHS: PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2006,
56 NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 7, 9 tb1.3 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/datalnvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_ 07.pdf.
38
CHILD TRENDS DATA BANK, TEEN BIRTHS II (2003), available at
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.orglpdf713_PDF.pdf.
39 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, BLACKS SEE GROWING VALUE GAP BETWEEN POOR AND
MIDDLE CLASS 3 (2007), available at http://pewsocialtrends.orgiassetslpdfIRace.pdf.
40 Id.
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These more basic supports involve education and training,
healthcare that includes, but is not centered on, reproductive health,
and support for balance in the workplace. Part of the problem may be
that, in their reliance on individual narratives, third-wave feminists
may not have access to the narratives of women unable to adequately
41
articulate their needs.
Listening to individual narratives may make it more difficult to
engage with the larger, systemic, and more fundamental group
problems. Indeed, third-wave feminists offer their own challenges to
the emphasis on individual narrative, and even on the terminology
"third-wave" and its suggested differentiation from other forms of
feminism. Some suggest that the term itself is no longer useful; 42
others suggest that the debate is useful in attempting
to determine if there's enough of a generational divide between older and
younger feminists to warrant a whole new label. The question seems to be,
have we moved far enough from the social issues that propelled the
women's movement in the 1960s and '70s to be able to suggest that there's
a new wave?43

Such questions help third-wave feminism define itself and its goals.
Indeed, there are some self-identified third-wave feminist agendas
44
that strive to make the .goals of gender equality more concrete. For
example, in their thirteen-point Manifesta, Baumgardner and Richards
include a comprehensive goal about women's involvement in the
armed forces, calling for women who wish to do so:
to participate in all reaches of the military, including combat, and to enjoy
all the benefits (loans, health care, pensions) offered to its members for as
long as we continue to have an active military. The largest expenditure of

41 See Crawford, supra note 4, at 166 (noting that "the only autobiographical account that
will make it into a book of third-wave feminist writing is one told by the person with enough
education, authority, and mental and cultural resources to write it.").
42 E.g., Lisa Jervis, The End 0/ Feminism's Third-wave, Ms. MAGAZINE, 2004, available
at http://www.msmagazine.comlwinter2004/thirdwave.asp.
43 Alison Piepmeier, Postfeminism vs. the Third-wave, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.
electronicbookreview.comlthreadlwritingpostfeminismlreconfiguredrip2. Piepmeier is the
author of Catching a Wave: Reclaiming Feminism/or the 21st Century (Rory Dicker & Alison
Piepmeier, eds., Northeastern University Press 2003).
44 Id. (noting that third-wave feminism "grapples with women's intersectional identities
and demands an end to all the forms of oppression that keep women from achieving their full
humanity."). See also Deborah Siegel, Women: What Next/or the Sexual Revolution?, THE
GUARDIAN (United Kingdom), Aug. 16,2007, at 16 (suggesting that the stripping pole is to
third-wave feminism what bra-burning was to second-wave feminists, and that third-wave
feminists are concerned with activism on a series of gender equality issues), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uklworldl2007/augl31/gender.uk.
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our national budget goes toward maintaining this welfare system, and
feminists have a duty to make sure women have access to very echelon. 45

Notwithstanding their approach to equity in the military, and their
critique of it as a ''welfare system," there is no comparable goal with
respect to other forms of public welfare. Indeed they make the
following two somewhat more modest demands concerning health care:
3. To make explicit that the fight for reproductive rights must include
birth control; the right for poor women and lesbians to have children ...
subsidized fertility treatments for all women who choose them; and
freedom from sterilization abuse. Furthermore, to support the idea that sex
can be - and usually is - for pleasure, not procreation ...
8. To have equal access to health care, regardless of income, which
includes coverage equivalent to men's and keeping in mind that women use
the system more often than men do because of our reproductive capacity.46

While gender equity in health care and in the military are
important signposts on the road to equality, these markers do not
provide the basic structural supports that women need to achieve the
potential that is so celebrated.
Instead, as we have argued elsewhere, women need to be trained
and educated to assume their roles in the economic future. Our
examination of how demographic differences correspond to
differences in understandings about values (such as views on the
regulation of sexuality or "family values"), and not just on hot button
issues, such as same-sex marriage or parental notification of abortion,
have resulted in our conclusion that the newer family culture is the
system that is better geared for the post-industrial economy. The
fundamentally religious and other "conservative" influences are
distracting the country from developing a family law system that
promotes economic growth and stronger families. In terms of macro
and micro economic and social stability, the family culture (of both
laws and life patterns) that is more typical in blue states provides a
model for the future. Policies that promote early marriage and higher
fertility produce less investment in each child, which in tum promotes
a less skilled labor force, which in tum attracts a less skilled industry,
which in tum keeps wage levels down and makes employers less
likely to offer paid leave and other benefits.
The conservative take on this is to re-impose values that tie
marriage and childbearing together, pushing a solution that depends on

45 BAUMGARDNER &
46 Id. at 279-80.

RICHARDS,

supra note 1, at 280.
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47
low income women getting married. David Blankenhorn flatly states,
"there is something specifically about marriage that tends to boost
earnings and reduce poverty.,,48 Federal marriage promotion efforts
emphasize responsibility on the parts of both men and women,
presuming that it is because both men and women are acting
irresponsibly that the non-marital childbirth has increased so
dramatically. If irresponsible sexual behavior is the problem, then
enforcing marriage is the solution that not only privatizes dependence
(solving welfare) but also benefits children. It is true that the
overwhelming majority of public welfare recipients (69.6%) are single,
while only 10.5% are married, and that approximately 90% of the
recipients are female. 49 On the other hand, only 0.1% of welfare
recipients stop receiving it because they married, while 20.9% leave
50
because of employment.
While we support adult commitment, forcing people to marry is
not the answer. Indeed, most people have a positive view of marriage,
51
and want to be married.
The state can help couples remain in
marriage, albeit without coercion or forcing one fixed idea of marriage
on all relationships - but that should not be the sole focus of
changing patterns of dependency. 52 The problems that cause most
single welfare recipients to receive aid will not be solved through
47 See KAy HYMOWITZ, MARRIAGE AND CASTE IN AMERICA: SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL
FAMILIES IN A POST-MARITAL AGE 30 (Ivan R. Dee 2006), available at http://www.cityjournal.org/htmVl6_I_marriage_gap.html.
48 DAVID J. BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 243 (2007). See also Amy Wax,
Engines of Inequality: Class, Race, and Family Structure, 41 FAM. L.Q. 567 (2007)
(providing an extremely thoughtful discussion of potential reasons for the disparity in
marriage rates by class).
49 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Active Cases, http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofaicharacterIFY2006/tab22.htm. tbl.22 (last
visited Aug. 29, 2008) (noting that from October 2005 until September 2006, 98,436
recipients oftemporary assistance were male, while 897,876 were women).
50 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Closed Cases, http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofalcharacter/FY2006/tab46.htm. tbl.46
(last visited Aug. 29, 2008).
51 See Alison Stein Wellner, The Marriage Habit: Baby Boomers May Have Believed in
Free Love, But Now They're Hooked on Matrimony, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHIC FORECAST,
March 2002, available at http://acuriousmind.typepad.comla_curious_mind/files/Forecast
BoomMarriage. pdf.
52 See generally, Theodora Ooms, The Role of the Federal Government in Strengthening
Marriage, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 163, 177-90 (2001) (suggesting five ways for the federal
government to promote marriage without imposing it, including improved data collection on
divorce, and removing the marriage penalty in the income tax code). See also Elizabeth Scott,
Marriage, Cohabitation, and the Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 225, 252-58 (arguing that marriage deserves "special" treatment, but that contracts
within cohabitating relationships merit enforcement as well).
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marriage. 53 Instead, education appears as a more feasible solution.
Lack of education is highly correlated with welfare receipt: more than
95% of all welfare recipients have twelve years of education or less,
compared to 50% of the general population. While education does not
guarantee that an individual will not receive public aid, it becomes
statistically less likely with each year of post-secondary education. 54
Consequently, a more comprehensive approach to the third-wave
vision of moving up the floor suggests a series of different approaches
that are designed to increase the economic independence of women
and the financial resources available to children. Marriage is not, as
the famous article goes, the panacea - but increasing education for
women and resources for children together with facilitating the lives of
parents who seek to be good parents and good workers are panaceas.
So is allowing girls access to contraceptives, comprehensive sex
education, and abortion.
First, the concept of choice, that is so important in third-wave
feminism, must be reconstructed. Regardless of issues concerning
choice and false consciousness,55 one choice generally forecloses other
future options. Thus, while the "choice" to become sexually active
must be protected, of course, the choice of girls who become pregnant
at sixteen may foreclose them from moving towards more autonomy
because they are then statistically much less likely to have other
choices concerning work and family.
While cultural norms are integral to structuring women's choices,
the law can support expanding those choices. Ultimately, policies
must support practices that train for the autonomy that will allow
women to decide for themselves when to have children and where to
work 56 This means: (1) cushioning the consequences of bad early
decisions so they are not permanently derailing to women; (2)
deterring early childbirth through comprehensive sex education
(encouraging responsibility and autonomy); and (3) enforcing laws
against domestic violence and coercive sex (more autonomy).
A second goal of third-wave feminism is gender equity. In
addition to enacting the ERA and allowing equal access to the
53

See generally, Vivian Hamilton, Will Marriage Promotion Work?, II J. GENDER, RACE

& JUST. 1 (2007).

54 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 49, at tb1.25.
55 See Crawford, supra note 4, at 166; see also JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:
WHY FAMIL YAND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
56 One important question at the conference concerned which women's lives should be
reproduced. We are not advocating one lifestyle over another; what we are advocating is that
women have the education and support to understand their choices.
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military,S7 this involves:
(1) conceptualizing mothers' role as
combining workforce participation and parenthood by making the
workplace more family friendly; (2) re-conceiving the safety net to
provide the things low income jobs are unlikely to provide including
health care, assistance with child care (probably through universal
preschool), and real unemployment assistance in a world where jobs
have become less permanent, and retraining may be critical; and (3)
improving education, specifically for low income children.
Achieving this goal requires specific laws that, for example,
mandate Medicaid funding for family planning (perhaps even a return
to funding for abortion, if this becomes politically feasible). It means
single parenthood with support - education, retraining, cycling in and
out of the workforce. Ensuring that employment is feasible for single
mothers involves the recognition that employers of poor· women
cannot realistically subsidize family leave or health benefits. Ann
O'Leary suggests, for example, that Congress provide funding for
family leave for newly employed welfare recipients. 58 Similar funding
could also be extended to health benefits to ensure that former welfare
recipients have adequate access without employers assuming the full
responsibility. Even more radically, laws could detach medical care
from employment.
In terms of family leave, as both second and third-wave feminists
argue, there must be meaningful access for both men and women,
which means requiring smaller workplaces to be covered and
shortening the waiting period for employee eligibility - and ensuring
that working class men buy into these roles. As third-wave feminism
(and second-wave feminists as well) remind us, men's roles are critical
to this enterprise, so this involves paying attention to the needs and
futures of unemployed and working class men. OthelWise, not only
will employers continue to hire men over women, but also women's
domestic roles will not change. When an employer does invest in the
individual, then the employer will also be more willing to provide
additional benefits to get them to stay. Mandating parental leave
makes individual jobs more expensive for employers, making them
less likely to hire poorly educated or unskilled workers. For poor
women, it is critical to prevent them either from being railroaded out
of employment permanently by helping them acquire the education
and skills necessary to move into jobs with more benefits.

57
58

See BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note
See O'Leary, supra note 15, at 60-61.
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Ultimately, all women need training for the realization of their
own autonomy and for gender equity. Enhancing women's workforce
opportunities through better education will strengthen them
economically as well as in their personal lives. The middle class
already trains for autonomy by putting in place the necessary
conditions for this status, including access to birth control, education,
and delay in family formation. Middle class women who then have
the capital to be worth more to employers can better negotiate
employment situations that are family friendly enough to keep them in
the workforce.
By contrast, poorer women are not trained for autonomy and do
not experience it; they have less access to contraception, which
produces unplanned pregnancies that derail education and the kind of
workforce participation that builds skills that contribute to long term
marketability. To change this cycle, there are a series of steps that
enhance choice and result in gender equity: more contraception, more
abortion, more support for single parents, and the creation of pathways
that provide for workforce participation and education after the birth
of the first child.

